The Internet is a man-made complex system under constant attacks (e.g., Advanced Persistent Threats and malwares). It is therefore important to understand the phenomena that can be induced by the interaction between cyber attacks and cyber defenses. In this paper, we explore the rich phenomena that can be exhibited when the defender employs active defense to combat cyber attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that shows that active cyber defense dynamics (or more generally, cybersecurity dynamics) can exhibit the bifurcation and chaos phenomena. This has profound implications for cyber security measurement and prediction: (i) it is infeasible (or even impossible) to accurately measure and predict cyber security under certain circumstances; (ii) the defender must manipulate the dynamics to avoid such unmanageable situations in real-life defense operations.
INTRODUCTION
Malicious attacks in cyberspace will remain to be a big problem for the many years to come. This is fundamentally caused by the complexity of the Internet and computer systems (e.g., we cannot assure that a large software system has no security vulnerabilities). It is therefore important to understand and characterize the phenomena that can be exhibited at the global level of a cyber system, ranging from an enterprise network to the entire cyberspace. The emerging framework of Cybersecurity Dynamics [34, 35, 7, 4] offers a systematic approach for understanding, characterizing, and quantifying the phenomena as well as cyber security in general.
Disclaimer. The active cyber defense strategy explored in the present paper does not advocate that defenders should retaliate from attackers, because it is well known that the attackers, or more precisely the IP addresses that are launching attacks against the victims, could well be victims that are abused by the real attackers as stepping stones. Moreover, defense-wares (i.e., "white" worms) are meant to clean up the compromised computers, not to compromise the secure computers. Most important of all, the active defense operations should be contained within the networks under the defender's jurisdiction (e.g., an enterprise network defender may use active defense to clean up the enterprise network but not going beyond the enterprise's perimeter). This can be assured, for example, by making the enterprise's computers and firewalls recognize defense-wares via digital signatures. This means that the enterprise computers will only run defense-wares that are accompanied with digital signatures that can be verified by the computers' hardware via an embedded signature verification key, and that the firewall recognizes and blocks out-bound defense-wares.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our active cyber defense dynamics model. In Section 3, we analyze equilibria (or attractors) of active cyber defense dynamics. In Section 4, we explore the transition between attractors. In Section 5, we investigate the emergence of bifurcation. In Section 6, we explore the chaos phenomenon. We discuss related prior work in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
The main notations we use are summarized as follows.
R, R + , C the sets of real numbers, positive real numbers and complex numbers, respectively (ω), (ω) the real and imaginary parts of complex number ω ∈ C, respectively In the n × n identity matrix GB, AB GB = (V, EB) is the defense network structure, AB is the adjacency matrix of GB GR, AR GR = (V, ER) is the attack network structure, AR is the adjacency matrix of GR
n×n is a diagonal matrix corresponding to adjacency matrix A = [a vu ]n×n, where dvv = n u=1 avu is the in-degree of node v in graph G corresponding to A λ(M ) the set of eigenvalues of matrix M λ1(M ) the eigenvalue of M with the largest real part (or λ1 when M is clear from the context) Bv(t), Rv(t) the probability that node v ∈ V is in sate blue (i.e., secure) and state red (i.e., compromised) at time t, respectively Bv(t) the average portion of blue nodes at time t ≥ 0, namely Bv(t) = 1 |V | v∈V Bv(t) B(t), R(t) B(t) = [B1(t), . . . , Bn(t)], R(t) = [R1(t), . . . , Rn(t)], where n = |V | B * the homogeneous equilibrium of B(t) as t → ∞, namely Bv(t) = σ ∀v ∈ V as t → ∞ f (·), g(·) f (·) : [0, 1] → {0} ∪ R + is the defense-power function, g(·) : [0, 1] → {0} ∪ R + is the attack-power function θv,BR(t) the probability that the state of node v changes from blue to red at time t θv,RB(t) the probability that the state of node v changes from red to blue at time t
EXTENDED ACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE DYNAMICS MODEL
Review of the model in [36] . Suppose attacker and defender interact in a cyber system that consists of a finite node population V = {1, 2, · · · , n}, where each node can abstract/represent a computer. At any time t ≥ 0, a node v ∈ V is in one of two states: blue, meaning that the node is secure but vulnerable to attacks; red, meaning that the node is compromised. For a given cyber system, the attacker spreads computer malwares (e.g., Advanced Persistent Threats) to compromise computers, while the defender spreads defense-wares (e.g., "white" worms) to detect and clean up (or "cure") the compromised computers. Suppose both the malwares and the defense-wares spread over the same attack-defense network structure, namely a finite simple graph G = (V, E), where V = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the vertex set mentioned above, and E is the edge set such that (u, v) ∈ E means (i) a compromised node u can attack a secure node v and (ii) a secure node u can use active defense to detect and clean up a compromised node v.
Our extension to the model in [36] . Rather than assuming the attacker and defender use the same attack-defense network structure, we consider two network structures: the defense network structure G B = (V, EB) over which defense-wares spread, and the attack network structure GR = (V, ER) over which malwares spread. Both network structures are directed or undirected graphs. Specifically, (u, v) ∈ EB means a secure node u can use active defense to "cure" a compromised node v, and (u, v) ∈ ER means a compromised node u can attack a secure node v. We do not make any restrictions on the attack/defense network structures, except that we assume GB and GR are simple graphs with no self-edges. 1 Note that the representation accommodates both directed and undirected graphs. Denote by Bv(t) and Rv(t) the probability that node v ∈ V is in state blue (i.e., secure) and state red (i.e., compromised) at time t, respectively. 
is the probability that node v's state changes from red to blue at time t, and θv,BR(t) is the probability that node v's state changes from blue to red at time t. This leads to the following master equation of active cyber defense dynamics:
In order to specify θv,RB(t), we use the concept of defensepower function f (·) : [0, 1] → {0} ∪ R + , which abstracts the power of the defense-ware in detecting and cleaning up compromised (red) nodes. In order to specify θv,BR(t), we use the concept of attack-power function g(·) : [0, 1] → {0}∪R + , which abstracts the power of the malware in compromising secure (blue) nodes. It is intuitive that both defense-power and attack-power functions should be dependent on the defense and attack network structures, respectively. Therefore, we have the following general form:
For the present characterization study, it is sufficient to require that the defense-power and attack-power functions possess some basic properties. First, we have f (0) = 0 because active defense must be launched from some blue node, and g(1) = 0 because attack must be launched from some red node. Second, we have f (x) > 0 for x ∈ (0, 1] because any active defense may succeed, and g(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, 1) because any attack may succeed. Third, the two functions do not have to abide by any specific relation, except that they are differentiable (for the sake of analytic treatment).
As a result, the master equation of active cyber defense dynamics, namely Eq. (1), becomes:
= 0 holds for all t ≥ 0 and all v ∈ V , Bv(t) + Rv(t) = 1 for all t and all v ∈ V . Therefore, we only need to consider the following master equation for v ∈ V :
(2)
The main research task is to analyze system (2) for all v ∈ V .
Remark. When we investigate specific attacks and defenses, we need to obtain their concrete attack-power and defense-power functions. Similarly, when we investigate specific cyber systems, we need to obtain the concrete attack and defense network structures. These are important research problems that are orthogonal to the focus of the present paper because our characterization study deals with all possible attack-power and defense-power functions as well as all possible attack and defense network structures. In principle, these functions and structures do exist, although how to obtain them is an excellent problem for future investigation.
EQUILIBRIA AND THEIR STABILITY
Equilibrium is an important concept for quantifying cyber security. Suppose σ is the equilibrium under certain active defense. We can quantify the effectiveness of active defense via the notion of σ-effectiveness because the dynamics converge to σ. Moreover, the stability of an equilibrium reflects the consequence/effect of perturbations, which can be caused (for example) by manipulations to the initial global state (e.g., the defender manually cleans up some compromised computers before launching active defense for more effectiveness -this may sound counterintuitive, but it actually shows the value of rigorous characterization study because the defender would not know this tactics otherwise).
We consider a class of equilibria of Eq. (2), namely homoge-
. This class contains the following:
• All-blue equilibrium, denoted by B * = 1; B * v = 1 for all v ∈ V (i.e., active defense is 1-effective).
• All-red equilibrium, denoted by B * = 0; B * v = 0 for all v ∈ V (i.e., active defense is 0-effective).
• σ-equilibrium, denoted by B * = σ ∈ (0, 1); B * v = σ for all v ∈ V (i.e., active cyber defense is σ-effective).
The Jacobian matrix of (2) near an equilibrium is denoted by
Existence and Stability of Equilibria
We show that homogeneous equilibria exist under the following hypothesis (or condition):
PROOF. Under hypothesis H0, namely
Thus B * = σ is an equilibrium. To see the stability of equilibrium B * = σ ∈ [0, 1], we consider a small perturbation to B * , namely δB
where In is the identity matrix of size n. Note that M as defined in Eq. (3) is the coefficient matrix of linear system (4) . The stability of equilibrium B * = σ is determined by the eigenvalues of matrix M . For the general case GB = (V, EB) = GR = (V, ER), it can be shown that
Proposition 1 can be simplified when σ = 0 and σ = 1.
PROOF. To prove the first part, we observe that g(1) = 0 implies H0 holds for σ = 1, namely that B * = 1 is an equilibrium of system (2) . For σ = 1, it can be shown that Eq. (4) becomes
Proposition 1 says that a sufficient condition under which equilib-
Since
is locally non-increasing at x = 1 and thus −g (1) ≥ 0. Since the sum for every row in matrix D −1 A R AR equals 1, the Perron-Frobenius theorem [10] says that its largest eigenvalue is 1. From Eq. (6), we have
To prove the second part, we observe that f (0) = 0 implies H0 with σ = 0, namely that B * = 0 is an equilibrium of (2). For σ = 0, Eq. (4) becomes
Proposition 1 says that the sufficient condition for equilibrium B * = 0 to be locally stable is
That is, if f (0) < g(0), then B * = 0 is locally stable; if f (0) > g(0), there exists at least one eigenvalue μ0 ∈ λ D −1 A B AB , say μ0 = 1, such that f (0) (μ0) − g(0) > 0, meaning that B * = 0 is locally unstable.
In the special case GB = GR, namely AB = AR, we immediately obtain the following corollary of Proposition 1: COROLLARY 2. Suppose hypothesis H0 holds and GB = GR = G (i.e., AB = AR = A). Let μ1 be the eigenvalue of D −1 A A that has the smallest real part. If the attack-power and defense-power functions satisfy one of the following two conditions:
If the attack-power and defense-power functions satisfy one of the two following conditions:
Examples
Example 1: Stability effect of different defense-power functions vs. a fixed attack-power function. Suppose GB = GR is an Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graph instance G = (V, E) with |V | = 2, 000 and edge probability p = 0.005 (i.e., every pair of nodes is connected with probability 0.005, independent of each other). We consider attack-power function g(x) = 1 − x against the following four scenarios of defense-power function f (x):
• Scenario I: f (x) = x 2 , meaning that B * = 0 is stable and B * = 1 is unstable.
• Scenario II: f (x) = x 2 +x, meaning that B * = 0 is unstable and B * = 1 is stable.
• Scenario III: f (x) = x 2 + 1 2 x, meaning that B * = 0 and B * = 1 are stable, but B * = 1 2 is unstable.
• Scenario IV: f (x) = −2x 2 + 2x, meaning that B * = 1 2 is stable, but B * = 0 and B * = 1 are unstable. Figure 2 plots the phase portraits of Bv(t) = 1 |V | v∈V Bv(t), the portion of secure nodes. We observe that the simulation results confirm the analytic results. Specifically, Figure 2 (a) shows that Now we study the stability of the equilibria. For the GB = GR mentioned above, we consider the above four scenarios as highlighted in Table 1 . More specifically, for time t ∈ [0, 150], the defense-power function is f (x) = x 2 + x and the attack-power function is g(x) = 1 − x (i.e, the above Scenario I); for time t ∈ [150, 300], the defense-power function is f (x) = x 2 and the attack-power function is g(x) = 1 − x (i.e., the above Scenario II); for time t ∈ [300, 400], the defense-power function is f (x) = −2x 2 + 2x and the attack-power function is g(x) = 1 − x (i.e., the above Scenario IV); for time t ∈ [400, 500], the defensepower function is f (x) = x 2 + 1 2 x and the attack-power function is g(x) = 1 − x (i.e., the above Scenario III). Figure 3 : Active cyber defense dynamics lack persistent equilibrium due to frequent perturbations. Figure 3 plots a very probable scenario that can happen to the portion of secure nodes, where three small perturbations are imposed at t = 150, 300, 400. This scenario is very probable because it can explain why the cyber security state may rarely enter some persistent equilibrium. Specifically, the initial value Bv(0), v ∈ V , is randomly chosen from interval (0, 0.01] by the uniform distribution. At t = 150, we find that Bv(150) = 1. We then impose a small perturbation on each Bv(150), by replacing Bv(150) with Bv(150) − εv where εv is an independent random variable of a uniform distribution in the interval [0, 0.01] for all v ∈ V . Similarly, we replace Bv(300) with Bv(300) + εv and Bv(400) with Bv(400) − εv for all v ∈ V . Figure 3 illustrates that under small perturbations, the overall cyber security dynamics never enter any persistent equilibrium. This offers one possible explanation why real-life cyber security is perhaps never in any equilibrium. Figure 4 (c) shows that there are three equilibria B * = 0, 0.38, 0.2, where the first two are stable but the last one is unstable. Figures 4(d) -4(f) show that there exist two equilibria B * = 0, σ with σ > 0, where B * = 0 is unstable and B * = σ is stable. We observe that active cyber defense dynamics exhibit different phenomena with respect to different parameters. Moreover, we observe a sort of phase transition in parameter ν: when ν ≤ 0.8, the global cyber security state converges to B * = 0 almost regardless of the initial value; when ν ≥ 1, the global cyber security state converges to some B * = σ > 0 almost regardless of the initial value; when 0.8 < ν = 0.85 < 1, the global cyber security state converges to some equilibrium dependent upon the initial value.
We summarize the discussion in this section into:
INSIGHT 1. Active cyber defense dynamics may rarely enter into any equilibrium because of perturbations to the global security state as caused by the manual cleaning of some compromised computers (Figure 2) , and/or because of perturbations to the attack/defense power function as caused by the introduction of a new attack/defense method (Figures 3-4 ) 
TRANSITION BETWEEN MULTIPLE ATTRACTORS
We are now ready to precisely characterize the transition between the equilibria, which reflects the consequence/effect of the defender manipulating the initial global security state (e.g., manually cleaning up some compromised computers before launching active defense) and/or manipulating the attack/defense network structure (e.g., by changing the network access control policy to block/allow certain computers to communicate with certain other computers).
Transition Between the All-blue and All-red Equilibria
Under the conditions mentioned in Corollary 1, namely, f (0) = g(1) = 0, system (2) has two locally stable equilibria B * = 1 and B * = 0. Let B = B1, B2, · · · , Bn ∈ [0, 1] n and R = 1 − B = 1 − B1, 1 − B2, · · · , 1 − Bn ∈ [0, 1] n , where n = |V |. For τ * 1 , τ * 2 ∈ (0, 1), we define two sets Ξ G B ,τ * 1 and Ξ G R ,τ * 2 as follows:
The following Theorem 1, whose proof is deferred to the Appendix, gives the transition between the all-blue and all-red equilibria by manipulating the initial state B(0). 
Case 2: Suppose the attack-power and defense-power functions sat-
If initial value R(0) ∈ Ξ G R ,τ * 2 , then lim t→∞ Rv(t) = 1 ∀v ∈ V .
The cyber security meaning of Theorem 1 is: Under a certain condition (case 1), the defender needs to manipulate the initial global security state B(0) to belong to Ξ G B ,τ * 1 to make active defense 1-effective; this says what the defender should strive to do. Under certain other circumstances (case 2), the defender should make sure that the initial global security state B(0) does not cause R(0) = 1 − B(0) ∈ Ξ G R ,τ * 2 , because in this regime active defense is 0effective; this says what the defender should strive to avoid.
For the following two corollaries, we define
On one hand, the following Corollary 3 says that when τ * 1 = τ * 2 = τ * , we obtain the same threshold for the transitions.
COROLLARY 3. Suppose f (·) and g(·) are continuous with f (0) = g(1) = 0. There exist constants τ ∈ (0, 1) and α > 0 such that the following two conditions hold: (i) The attack-power and the defense-power functions satisfy f (z) > α · z for any z ∈ (τ * , 1), and for any
(ii) The attack-power and the defense-power functions satisfy g (z) > α(1 − z) for any z ∈ (0, τ * ), and for any
On the other hand, the following Corollary 4 makes a connection to [36] , by accommodating Theorems 1, 5, 8 and 9 in [36] as a special case with GB = GR and α = 1. 
Example
We consider the transition between equilibria B * = 0 and B * = 1 as caused by varying the initial value B(0). We use two concrete defense-power and attack-power functions:
which are plotted in Figure 5 (a). The graphs GB and GR are two ER graph instances with |V | = 2, 000 and p = 0.5. We consider the transition induced by varying the initial value Bv(0) between 0 and 1. Figure 5 (b) shows that when Bv(0) > 0.5, the dynamics converge to B * = 1; when Bv(0) < 0.5, the dynamics converge to B * = 0.
The exploration in this section can be summarized as:
A small change in the initial global security state, in the model parameters, in the attack network structure, or in the defense network structure can lead to substantial change in active cyber defense dynamics. A rigorous characterization, such as Theorem 1, can offer precise guidance on "what the defender should strive to do" and "what the defender should strive to avoid" (e.g., how to manipulate the dynamics to benefit the defender rather than the attacker).
HOPF BIFURCATION
We consider Hopf bifurcation near equilibrium B * = σ ∈ (0, 1) under condition (1 − σ) · f (σ) = σ · g(σ). Recall that the stability of B * = σ ∈ (0, 1) depends on λ1(M ), where M , as defined in Eq. (3) , is the Jacobian matrix of system (2) . In the rest of the paper, we may simplify the notation λ1(M ) as λ1 unless there is potential ambiguity.
Consider differentiable defense-power and attack-power functions f (x, ν) and g(x, ν) with parameter ν. Suppose ∂f ∂ν , ∂g ∂ν and ∂M ∂ν all depend on ν. Consider the following critical condition for Hopf bifurcation:
(λ1) = 0 and (λ1) = 0.
It is known that if (13) holds for some ν = ν * , λ1(ν) is differentiable in ν, and dλ 1 dν = 0 at ν = ν * , then system (2) exhibits Hopf bifurcation [24] . Therefore, we need to find the critical value ν * . For this purpose, we adopt the approach described in [20] to investigate how λ1 depends on the permutation to M , namely to conduct a perturbation spectral analysis to compute the perturbation to λ1, denoted by δλ1, as caused by perturbation to M , denoted by δM .
How to Estimate δλ1
Let x1 be the eigenvector of M associated to eigenvalue λ1, namely, M x1 = λ1x1. For perturbation δM to M , M + δM can be described as M (ν) + M (ν)δν. The perturbation to M causes perturbation δλ1 to λ1 and perturbation δx1 to x1. That is,
By ignoring the second-order term, we obtain
By multiplying both sides of Eq. (14) with the left eigenvector y1 corresponding to λ1, we obtain y 1 Mδx1 + y 1 δM x1 = y 1 λ1δx1 + y 1 δλ1x1, y 1 λ1δx1 + y 1 δM x1 = y 1 λ1δx1 + y 1 δλ1x1,
As a result, we can estimate δλ1 as
where δM can be estimated depending on whether the perturbation is to the attack and/or defense power (Case A below) or to the attack/defense network structure (Case B below).
Case A: δM is caused by perturbation to attack-and/or defense power. Suppose the perturbation is imposed on parameter ν in the attack-power and defense-power functions f (x, ν) and g(x, ν), where ∂f ∂ν and ∂g ∂ν depend on ν as mentioned above. The cyber security meanings of such perturbations is (for example) that new attack and/or defense techniques are introduced. Note that
In δν.
In the special case GB = GR = G (i.e., the adjacency matrix AB = AR = A), we have
In for all μ ∈ λ(D −1 A A), and the perturbation can be rewritten as
Hence, (15) becomes
In δν · x1 y 1 x1. (16) Case B: δM is caused by perturbation to attack and/or defense network structure. Suppose the perturbation is imposed on GB = (V, EB) and/or GR = (V, ER) by adding/deleting edges. The cyber security meaning of such perturbations is that the network is disrupted (e.g., edges are deleted by the attacker, or security policies have changed) and then edges are added by the defender. We assume that the number of added/deleted edges is small (compared with |EB| and |ER|, respectively) so that we can approximately treat δM as a small perturbation. Let CB = D −1 A B AB and CR = D −1 A R AR. Perturbations to AB and AR lead to AB + δAB and AR + δAR, respectively. Correspondingly, we obtain the perturbations to CB and CR:
Then, the perturbation to Jacobian matrix M is
From (15), we have
Note that in the special case GB = GR = G (i.e., AB = AR = A) with perturbations δCB = δCR, we have
Example: Hopf Bifurcation Induced by Perturbation to Parameter
In order to show that Hopf bifurcation can happen, we consider an ER graph GB = GR = G = (V, E) with |V | = 2, 000 and edge probability p = 0.005. Let μ1 denote the eigenvalue of D −1 A A with the smallest real part, where A is the adjacency matrix of G. For the ER graph, we have (μ1) = −0.3448. We consider the following defense-power and attack-power functions:
where f (x) does not depend on ν. Recall that under condition (1 − σ)f (σ) = σg(σ), there exists equilibrium B * = σ ∈ (0, 1).
When ν = 3, we have homogeneous equilibrium B * = 0.7, which is locally stable according to the second condition in the first part of Corollary 2:
When ν = 4, we have homogeneous equilibrium B * = 0.6667, which is locally unstable according to the second condition in the second part of Corollary 2:
Therefore, there is a critical value between ν = 3 and ν = 4, at which (λ1(M )) = 0. By conducting 100 independent simulation runs of ν ∈ [3, 4) with step-length 0.01, we find the critical value ν = 3.8 and the corresponding equilibrium B * = 0.6724, where Figure 6 (c) plots the bifurcation diagram with respect to ν ∈ (3, 6) . Figure 6(d) plots the bifurcation diagram with respect to ν ∈ (4.75, 5.5). We observe that when ν ∈ (5, 5.5), there are not only two-periodic trajectories, but also k-periodic trajectories (k > 2). In summary, the periodic trajectories exhibit the perioddoubling cascade phenomenon.
Example: Hopf Bifurcation Induced by Perturbation to Attack/Defense Network Structures
For the purpose of demonstrating the bifurcation phenomenon caused by perturbation to network structures, we use two randomly generated ER graph examples GB = (V, EB) and GR = (V, ER), both with |V | = 2, 000 and p = 0.005. The average degree is 10.0565 for GB and 11.1865 for GR. We use the following defense-power and attack-power functions:
We perform 100 iterations of operations to GR as follows: during each of the first 50 iterations, we delete 226 edges (or 1% of the edges in the original ER) chosen independently and uniformly at random; during each of the following 50 iterations, we add 226 edges chosen independently and uniformly random among all the unconnected edges. That is, we delete and then add 50% edges of the original |ER|. Figure 7 demonstrates that the period-doubling cascade phenomenon appears and finally leads to chaos after deleting more than 36% edges and before adding 14% edges. We observe that eventually the diagram becomes stable after adding the same number of edges as those deleted. (Note that Figure 7 is not symmetric because the added edges are random and in general are different from the edges that are deleted.)
The following insight summarizes the exploration of this section. in certain patterns. These situations are "unmanageable" because it would be infeasible, if not impossible, to estimate the global security state in real-time. Therefore, the defender must strive to avoid such unmanageable situations by manipulating the dynamics carefully (e.g., by disrupting the bifurcation condition or containing the attack-power of the adversary). Figure 6 (c) shows that the number of periodic points increase with parameter ν, which hints that system (2) can exhibit the chaos phenomenon. To see this, we consider the case GB = GR. In this case, system (2) becomes
CHAOS
Let F Bv(0), t denote the right-hand part. Consider Bv(0) and Bv(0) + εv(0) for all v ∈ V , where εv(0) ∈ R n is a small perturbation to the initial point Bv(0). Then, we have ∀v ∈ V ,
where DF Bv(0), t is the Jacobian matrix of the map F at time t. By the QR decomposition of matrix ε(t) = [ε1(t), ε2(t), · · · , εn(t)] where n = |V |, we obtain matrix
where q(t) is an orthogonal matrix and r(t) is an upper triangular matrix. Note that ε(t) = q(t) and the diagonal element λii(t) of rt at time t is the exponential magnification, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Thus, the average rate of divergence or convergence of the two trajectories F Bv(0), t t ≥ 0 and {F Bv(0) + εv(0), t t ≥ 0 for all v ∈ V is defined by
where Li for i = 1, 2, · · · , n are the Lyapunov characteristic exponents. It is known [24] that under some mild conditions, the above limit exists and is finite for almost all initial values B(0) = [B1(0), B2(0), · · · , Bn(0)] and for almost all matrices ε(0). Note that MLE = max 1≤i≤n Li indicates whether the dynamical system is chaotic or not. More specifically, when MLE > 0, a small perturbation to the initial value will lead to an exponential separation and therefore leads to the chaos phenomenon.
Example. Consider an ER graph instance GB = GR with |V | = 2, 000 and p = 0.005, and the following defense-power and attackpower functions: Figure 8 (a) plots the MLE with respect to ν. We observe that MLE > 0 when ν > 5, meaning that system (17) exhibit chaos for ν > 5. Figure 8 (b) plots the phase portrait of Bv(t) (i.e., the average of the Bv(t)'s for all v ∈ V ) when ν = 8, which hints the emergence of chaos. This means that the defender should strive to avoid the parameter regime ν > 5. This leads to the following: INSIGHT 4. Active cyber defense dynamics can be chaotic, meaning that it is impossible to predict the global cyber security state because it is too sensitive to the accuracy of the estimated initial global security state. Therefore, the defender must strive to avoid such unmanageable situations (e.g., by disrupting the attacks to assure ν ≤ 5 in the above example).
RELATED WORK
Cybersecurity Dynamics is a framework for modeling and quantifying cyber security from a holistic perspective (rather than modeling and analyzing security of components or building-blocks) [34, 35, 36, 17] . This framework builds on a large body of literature across Computer Science, Mathematics and Statistical Physics (cf. [7, 4, 33, 37, 38, 17, 39, 29, 6, 3, 28, 23, 11, 12] and the references therein), which can be further traced back to the century-old studies on biological epidemic models [19, 13, 8] .
As a specific kind of cybersecurity dynamics, active cyber defense dynamics were first rigorously modeled and studied in [36] , despite that the idea of active defense has been discussed and debated for many years [14, 31, 18, 16, 26, 30, 1, 2] . We move a significant step beyond [36] , by separating the attack network structure from the defense network structure, and by considering more general attack and defense power functions. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show that bifurcation and chaos are relevant in the cyber security domain, and to discuss the cyber security implications of these phenomena. Following [36] , Lu et al. [17] investigate optimal active defense strategies in the Control-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic frameworks. Our study is complementary to [17] as we leave it to future work to investigate optimal strategies in our setting.
It is worth mentioning that models of Lotka-Volterra type [9] capture the predator-prey dynamics, which are however different from the active cyber defense dynamics. Active cyber defense dynamics may be seen as the non-linear generalization of the socalled Voter model in complex networks [25, 15] . Somewhat related to our work is [5] , which considers chaotic dynamics in discretetime limited imitation contagion model on random networks.
CONCLUSION
We have explored the rich phenomena that can be exhibited by active cyber defense dynamics. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to show that bifurcation and chaos are relevant in the cyber security domain. The implication is of high practical value: In order to make cyber security measurement and prediction feasible, the defender must manipulate the cyber security dynamics to avoid these unmanageable situations.
Interesting problems for future research include: First, we need to characterize non-homogeneous equilibria as we only focused on homogeneous equilibria. Second, we need to characterize which graph structure is more advantageous to the other (e.g., GB is ER graph but GR is power-law graph). Third, we need to explore the chaos phenomenon further (e.g., multi-direction chaos). Fourth, we need to systematically validate the models.
